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## Gender and Value Orientations—What's the Difference!? The Case of Japan and the United States

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*This paper analyzes gendered social identity in Japan and the United States, countries with comparable postindustrial economic systems but distinct cultural traditions. Using national surveys (1995), we find gender differences in value orientations to be neither systematic nor consistent. They often disappeared after controlling for demographic and human-capital variables, though not so often for Japan. Other variables proved more important predictors of values than gender, although in different ways in Japan and the United States. We conclude by reassessing the use of the term gender in social research and the cultural meaning of gender relations by addressing the feminist concerns with issues of gender location.*

**KEY WORDS:** value orientations; social identity; gender; cross-cultural survey; Japan and the United States.

### INTRODUCTION

In this paper, we address issues of gendered social identity in Japan and the United States by raising theoretical and empirical questions about gender differences, the use of gender categorization in research, and the relationship between social structures and values. We propose to study social identity by using a comparative analysis of Japan and the United States to

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sis of the intersection of gender with human-capital factors through iterative work, while remaining aware of the potential interpretive bias and ideological elements of such gender categorization (Ridgeway, 2005). We also recognize several limitations of our research: the data is based on cross-sectional surveys rather than being longitudinal, which may limit our interpretations of causality; the information collected has no data on the psychological components of the self and the meaning that individuals attribute to their actions; and, finally, the demographic and socioeconomic characteristics since the survey was conducted in 1995 limit some of our interpretations. Despite these limitations, we believe that our analyses significantly advance our understanding of gender differences across social arenas and across countries along the lines analyzed by Inglehart and Norris (2003) in their comparative study of gender equality and cultural change, in which they stress the importance of cultural traditions in affecting gender equality. In this brief discussion of the literature on values and gender and a short description of the sociocultural differences between Japan and the United States, we present our quantitative results.

### BRIEF REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE ON VALUES AND GENDER DIFFERENCE

Research on gender differences in values provides contradictory findings. In the view of a minority, found primarily among evolutionary psychologists and sociobiologists, gender differences stem from long-lasting sociobiological features. Psychologists believe that sexuality, sexual orientation, and psychological traits form the basis of personality structure and gender identity. Some psychological models stress gender differences based on different modes of identification, internalization, and relatedness with the environment (Chodorow, 1978; Gilligan, 1982; Benjamin, 1995). Many such studies have been criticized for universalizing gender differences rather than recognizing the socioeconomic contexts that sustain relational capabilities and different ethics of care (Sevenhuijsen, 2003).

Most findings on value differences by gender have shown a lack of consistency and small gender effects (Maccoby and Jacklin, 1974; Unger, 1992). When researchers find differences, they suggest that these may reflect artifacts of comparable data, small sample size, and different definitions of variables rather than reflecting "true" gender differences (Frodi *et al.*, 1977). There is somewhat of a consensus that women tend to be more relational and altruistic, while men tend to be more competitive and aggressive (Frodi, 1990; Beutel and Marini, 1995). However, claiming clear-cut gender differences runs the risk of universalizing gender by taking essentialist

positions, as social psychologists have argued (Deaux and Major, 1990; Eagly, 1995).

Sociologists view gender roles in terms of how they are acquired and transmitted in social institutions from childhood through adulthood and into old age. As Simone de Beauvoir so clearly expressed, "One is not born a woman, one becomes a woman" (1970:725). Feminist approaches to gender identity contextualize gender/sex relations by specifying how gender as a process is commodified and shaped within specific sociohistorical contexts of domination (Rubin, 1975; West and Fenstermaker, 1995; Connell, 1987; Butler, 1999). The reconceptualization of the analysis of gender differences within a framework of intersectionality and multiculturalism by women of color (Baca-Zinn and Dill, 1996; Anderson and Collins, 2004) provides a framework for our analysis by alerting us to the dangers of Eurocentricity.

This brief discussion of the literature shows the complexity of the questions raised around gender differences in parceling out the influence of biological, psychological, cultural, and social factors on value orientations. More often than not it is difficult to assess "real" gender differences because of the assumed unidirectional links between social structures and gendered values, and because of the complexity of assessing intervening factors. Social theorists have increasingly argued that we should focus on understanding the concrete experiences of men and women rather than dealing with the abstract concept of gender that becomes singled out and arbitrarily isolated from other social factors (Ward, 1993). We are aware of the limitations of using gender as an analytic device in our quantitative work. Consequently, in our theoretical analysis and discussion we shift the focus, when appropriate, to an analysis of gender relations and gendering within specific sociocultural contexts in Japan and the United States.

### OVERALL DESCRIPTION OF KEY SOCIOCULTURAL DIFFERENCES BETWEEN JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES

Before analyzing selected values from the *Generations Survey*, we provide an overview of some key socioeconomic similarities as well as cultural and historical differences that will help us make sense of the survey findings. Japan and the United States share comparable standards of living and have undergone processes of modernization that make them comparable on dimensions such as level of education, income distribution, technology, and health status. Japan is the only non-Western country that has adopted and profited from a market economy, which makes a comparative analysis with the United States meaningful. Despite these similarities, Japan and the

United States have markedly different geographies, histories, and cultural traditions. The comparative analysis is bound to reveal striking differences in their values and senses of selfhood (Nisbett, 2003), yet we also expect some overlap to provide a complex picture of the interaction between individual and structural factors in shaping value orientations.

As a nation established by immigrants, the United States has prided itself on its heterogeneity and its mix of cultural traditions, while Japan has attempted to maintain its homogeneity through such dramatic steps as a self-imposed isolation from international exchange for more than two centuries (1639–1853). The United States has a relatively short history as a nation compared to that of Japan, which reflects political and cultural processes over two millennia. Greater pervasive group mentality, extensive social rituals, and a mythical sense of belonging to a sacred imperial line have been used to support nationalistic feelings over centuries. However, with rapid urbanization, the crisis in housing, and tight labor market conditions, these ideas are changing, especially in large urban populations (Mackie, 2003).

Americans share an allegiance to a set of principles outlined in the nation's founding documents and adhere to a belief in the "American Dream" based on individual achievement. The immigrant basis of the U.S. society has often resulted in a focus on the short term—on the dream of material prosperity and the achievement of social status during one's lifetime. The immigrants who came to the United States left behind communities and traditional lifestyles, forging social identities in a new land. Hence, attachment to the past does not have the same meaning or importance for Americans as it does for Japanese. The cultural ethos based on geographical and social mobility, individualism, and civil liberties is likely to have been associated with rapid social change, cultural confrontations, and generational conflicts rather than with the creation of idealized and stable intergenerational bonds based on a mythical sense of historical continuity. At the risk of oversimplifying, we can assert that to be "American" is to share the belief in a set of abstract principles concerning ideas of individual accomplishment and democratic rights, while to be "Japanese" is to share the belief in a concrete set of unique cultural and historical traditions.

The sociohistorical differences between Japan and the United States are important when looking at the relationship between private and public spheres, especially when analyzing the role of women in the workforce and the family, as we discuss later. The outcomes of modernization, such as higher standards of living, greater educational attainment, and consumerism, are narrowing cultural differences, especially among the young. In both countries, changes in gender relations in the private domain of the family have occurred more slowly than in the public domains of work, law,

and politics, especially in Japan (White, 1992; Goode, 1993; Hashimoto, 1996). But despite the trend toward greater economic similarities and cultural homogenization between Japan and the United States, a previous analysis using the *Generations Survey* data has suggested that value systems continue to be shaped in culturally distinct ways despite surface similarities (Silver and Muller, 1997). Gender differences in socioeconomic outcomes such as income, education, and occupational attainment in the United States and Japan are well documented (Spilerman and Peterson, 1999; Grusky, 2001; Gelb, 2003). In the United States, women in 1995 made 71.4¢ to the dollar; women are still concentrated in a few occupations with income and statuses lower than that of men (Reskin, 1993); and women received fewer doctorates in science and engineering and fewer professional degrees. Despite the impact of the women's movement on American society and the passage of laws and regulations to promote greater gender equality, gender differences have persisted (Maume, 1999). In Japan, gender differences in outcomes are even greater. Women in 1996 made only 64¢ to the dollar, and the female labor force participation rate for full-time workers is one of the lowest among industrialized nations. Women in Japan are much more likely to drop out of the labor force when marrying and to reenter it only after the children have grown up, a pattern that was true of women in the United States 20 years ago. In Japan, women are at a disadvantage legally and economically compared to men (Kalleberg and Lincoln, 1988; Wright and Baxter, 1995). The difference between the two countries is well captured in the Gender Equality Scale created by Inglehart and Norris to measure attitudes toward gender equality in 61 countries. The study shows clear differences in cultural attitudes toward sex roles and gender equality. Japan ranks much lower (39th) than the United States (9th) on the index, reflecting greater traditional attitudes toward gender roles (2003:33). Many of these cultural differences play a role in our analysis of gendered value orientations.

## DESCRIPTION OF THE DATA AND HYPOTHESES

The findings in this paper are based on datasets collected in 1995 under the co-sponsorship of the International Longevity Center (New York) and the International Longevity Center (Tokyo). The study is based on national random samples of individuals 18 years of age and older (Japan = 1,761, and the United States = 1,500).<sup>5</sup> The questionnaire was the joint product

<sup>5</sup> Louis Harris and Associates collected data through questionnaires in the United States, and the Central Research Services collected data through face-to-face interviews in Japan. The questionnaire was made up of closed-ended questions.

of Japanese and American researchers.<sup>6</sup> The questions are largely identical, though some questions targeted particular subgroups in each country.

There is a tradition of cross-national studies of values and attitudes from the Euro-Barometers, sponsored by the Commission of the European Communities, and the World Values Survey, conducted by the European Value Systems Study Group (Stoetzel, 1983) to more recent studies that have compared the impact of national variation and globalization on values—without, however, looking at gender differences (Schwartz, 1992; Inglehart, 2000). There are also separate value surveys in the United States and Japan (Cleaver, 1976), although they do not lend themselves to easy and reliable comparisons. In Japan, for example, surveys of values and attitudes have been conducted every 5 years since 1953 under government sponsorship that provided a comprehensive survey of the “Japanese National Character” (Hayashi and Kuroda, 1997). With rare exceptions, these large-scale, cross-national studies have not studied gender differences in values.

Thus, what makes the *Generations Survey* special is that it is not government sponsored, that it uses identical questionnaires in Japan and the United States, and that it is based on national random samples. The challenge for researchers doing comparative work on values is the problem of identifying their meaning in the context in which they are anchored. In our research, we contextualize values by analyzing their expression in concrete social arenas, rather than proposing an analysis of a modal national character (Inkeles, 1996). This is especially important when analyzing gender/sex relations because of the cultural and ideological nature of these definitions (Gelb, 2003). In view of the cultural and structural differences discussed previously, we put forward the following hypotheses.

### Hypotheses

First, we hypothesize that value differences in specific social domains will reflect the unequal positions of men and women in society. Specifically, we expect significant variations in value orientations: we expect women to support more strongly values that stress familial, cultural and traditional value orientations, roughly encompassing the private sphere, and we expect men to support more strongly individual and political orientations,

<sup>6</sup>The teams paid close attention to the wording of the questions to ensure clarity and comparability of meaning. The final questionnaire was retranslated into English by two native Japanese researchers working independently, and their translations were compared. Income from the Japanese survey was converted into the U.S. dollar-income categories using the Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) for dollars and yen for 1993.

roughly encompassing the public sphere. We hypothesize gender differences in values to differ by country, reflecting the greater “traditional” nature of Japanese society and the role of women. We expect to find greater gender gaps in values in Japan than in the United States.

Second, we hypothesize that in both countries gender effects will disappear with the introduction of controls, since gender relations cannot be isolated from the context in which they are experienced. We expect variables like income and education to be as important as gender in determining values because of their important effects on lifestyle. We hypothesize that national cultures would have a stronger impact on value orientations than gender because gender relations are embedded in and shaped by social and cultural factors rather than being a social force on their own.

Finally, we hypothesize that social location will affect women and men differently, as evidenced by the presence of interaction effects. We expect marriage and children to affect women more than men because of different gender-role expectations in the family and different social constraints. Likewise, we expect employment status to affect women more than men because women’s lives are altered more drastically when they work, due to complex linkages between work, family, and the community. We do not expect to find significant interaction terms between gender and education because, as an institution, education is less invested in promoting gender differences, although gender segregation by field of study or differential treatment by teachers can cause education to have different effects on women. Finally, we do not expect to find income interactions because income promotes comparable life styles.

## GENDER DIFFERENCES IN VALUES IN THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN

We start our analysis by providing an overview of the extent of gender differences on 18 individual value-items and 5 value orientations (scales)—using an analysis of means and mean differences.

### An Analysis of Gender Differences Based on Value-Items<sup>7</sup>

Starting with the case of the United States, we see the following picture of gender differences in value-items (Table I). Of the 18 values

<sup>7</sup>The responses to variables v48–v60 were “strongly agree,” “agree,” “no opinion,” “disagree,” and “strongly disagree,” on a 1–5 scale. The responses to variables v159, v167, v175, v183a, and v232–v235 were yes/no. We used *t*-tests for value-items measured on a five-point scale and chi-squares for value-items measured dichotomously.

**Table I.** Mean Gender Differences<sup>a</sup> on Value-Items in the United States and Japan

United States			
Value-items: Means and standard deviations (in parentheses)	Women	Men	Means difference
<b>Individual values (values 1-5: 1 = strongly disagree; 5 = strongly agree)</b>			
One can succeed by trying very hard and having a little bit of luck. (v48)	4.45 (0.850)	4.42 (0.873)	0.03
If you have money, almost everything will go your way. (v49)	2.30 (1.42)	2.63 (1.46)	-0.33*
You should honestly say what you think, even if it means hurting another person. (v50)	2.98 (1.44)	3.30 (1.45)	-0.32*
<b>Familial values (values 1-5: 1 = strongly disagree; 5 = strongly agree)</b>			
Life without children is empty. (v55)	3.73 (1.51)	3.40 (1.50)	0.33*
Older people should be respected primarily because of their age. (v56)	3.73 (1.40)	3.65 (1.38)	0.08
Breaking a promise to a family member is acceptable when your job requires it. (v58)	2.72 (1.49)	2.64 (1.45)	0.08
<b>Cultural values (values 1-5: 1 = strongly disagree; 5 = strongly agree)</b>			
One must never forget the kindness received from others. (v51)	4.86 (0.421)	4.78 (0.622)	0.08*
A person should not resort to a means he or she knows is wrong, even though it will lead to success. (v52)	4.18 (1.32)	4.03 (1.34)	0.15*
One should actively participate in local activities and functions. (v57)	3.90 (1.10)	3.85 (1.10)	0.05
One should actively sacrifice some of his or her lifestyle for the sake of society. (v60)	3.32 (1.40)	3.45 (1.37)	-0.13
<b>Value-Items: Percentage supporting each item</b>			
<b>Traditional values (values 0-1: 0 = no, and 1 = yes)</b>			
One shouldn't behave in a way that goes against his/her parents' expectations. (v159)	47.0%	43.6%	3.4
A desirable household is one in which the man works and the woman takes care of the home. (v167)	25.4%	24.8%	0.6
It is best to save as much money as possible for the future. (v175)	71.3%	69.8%	1.5

**Table I. continued.**

United States			
Value-items: Percentage supporting each item	Women	Men	Percentage difference
A person should continue to use his or her possessions, even when they are rather old. (v183)	85.6%	83.2%	2.4
<b>Political values (values 0-1: 0 = no, and 1 = yes)</b>			
It is important to pass on local culture and traditions to the next generation. (v232)	48.3%	47.8%	0.5
It is important to pass on the value of defending one's country to the next generation. (v233)	49.7%	56.5%	-6.8*
It is important to pass on the value of democracy to the next generation. (v234)	54.7%	59.4%	-4.7*
It is important to pass the value of protecting the environment to the next generation. (v235)	62.1%	62.0%	0.1
<b>Japan</b>			
Value-items: Means and standard deviations (in parentheses)	Women	Men	Means difference
<b>Individual values (values 1-5: 1 = strongly disagree; 5 = strongly agree)</b>			
One can succeed by trying very hard and having a little bit of luck. (v48)	3.68 (1.34)	3.69 (1.36)	-0.01
If you have money, almost everything will go your way. (v49)	2.63 (1.48)	2.72 (1.49)	-0.09
You should honestly say what you think, even if it means hurting another person. (v50)	2.76 (1.42)	3.16 (1.46)	-0.4*
<b>Familial values (values 1-5: 1 = strongly disagree; 5 = strongly agree)</b>			
Life without children is empty. (v55)	4.16 (1.26)	4.38 (1.06)	-0.22*
Older people should be respected primarily because of their age. (v56)	3.88 (1.21)	3.77 (1.30)	0.11
Breaking a promise to a family member is acceptable when your job requires it. (v58)	3.53 (1.34)	3.76 (1.26)	-0.23*
<b>Cultural values (values 1-5: 1 = strongly disagree; 5 = strongly agree)</b>			
One must never forget the kindness received from others. (v51)	4.84 (0.431)	4.75 (0.577)	0.09*

Table I. continued.

United States		Women	Men	Means difference
Value-items: Means and standard deviations (in parentheses)				
A person should not resort to a means he or she knows is wrong, even though it will lead to success. (v52)				
		4.53 (0.944)	4.45 (1.02)	0.08
One should actively participate in local activities and functions. (v57)				
		4.01 (1.01)	4.04 (1.03)	-0.03
One should actively sacrifice some of his or her lifestyle for the sake of society. (v60)				
		2.93 (1.28)	3.23 (1.34)	-0.3*
Value-items: Percentage supporting each item				
Traditional values (values 0-1: 0 = no and 1 = yes)				
One shouldn't behave in a way that goes against his/her parents' expectations. (v159)				
	Women	49.7%	Men	44.8%
				4.9*
A desirable household is one in which the man works and the woman takes care of the home. (v167)				
	Women	49.3%	Men	58.8%
				-9.5*
It is best to save as much money as possible for the future. (v175)				
	Women	85.7%	Men	83.9%
		79.5%		1.8
A person should continue to use his or her possessions, even when they are rather old. (v183)				
	Women	79.5%	Men	75.2%
				4.3*
Political values (values 0-1: 0 = no and 1 = yes)				
It is important to pass on local culture and traditions to the next generation. (v232)				
	Women	38.6%	Men	42.7%
				-4.1*
It is important to pass on the value of defending one's country to the next generation. (v233)				
	Women	31.1%	Men	35.4%
				-4.3*
It is important to pass on the value of democracy to the next generation. (v234)				
	Women	35.0%	Men	43.8%
				-8.8*
It is important to pass the value of protecting the environment to the next generation. (v235)				
	Women	73.1%	Men	72.7%
				0.4

<sup>a</sup>Women/men.

\**p* < 0.05.

analyzed in the United States, 7 show statistically significant gender differences, but overall many of the gender differences are small. Men show stronger support for materialist interests (v49) and for directness in communication (v50), and they are more politically oriented, with stronger support for nationalism (v233) and democracy (v234). Compared to men, women give greater support to values regarding interconnectedness (v51), fairness (v52), and children (v55). These results seem to support previous research showing that men are more individualistic, materialistic, and primarily interested in the public sphere; and that women are more relational, ethical, and primarily interested in the private sphere.

However, our findings point to a more complex image of gender difference than these findings suggest. Equally important, there were no statistically significant gender differences in the United States for 11 value-items regarding attitude toward social mobility (v48), respect for elders (v56), priority of work over family (v58), volunteering (v57), social altruism (v60), conforming to parents' expectations (v159), traditional division of labor in the home (v167), saving (v175), restraint in consumer habits (v183), cultural continuity (v232), and protecting the environment (v235). Some of these values, such as priority of work over family or social altruism, are traditionally associated with one gender. This gender overlap in a number of values suggests a uniformity of societal expectations such as the shared views of the "American dream," a theme that we develop later.

Our analysis of Japan revealed a different picture regarding gender differences, with a larger number of statistically significant value differences between men and women (Table I). Of the 18 value-items analyzed in Japan, 11 show statistically significant mean differences between genders. The direction of the differences is revealing. We see that men have higher means—that is, they support these values more strongly—on eight items, while women have higher means on only three items. Japanese men support more strongly the value of directness (v50), traditional division of labor in the home (v167), the value of children (v55), and the priority of work over the family (v58). In the political arena, men support more strongly cultural continuity (v232) and nationalism (v233), as well as democratic views (v234). Women more strongly support the importance of interconnectedness (v51), conformity of children to parental expectations (v159), and restraint in consumer habits (v183).

Thus, values held by Japanese men are stronger and encompass wider social arenas, supporting the idea of a patriarchal social order in Japan. Furthermore, the value-items connected with the family were more strongly endorsed by Japanese men than women. In Japan, the tension between the demands of home and work is different from that in the United States. As our



data suggested, Japanese men had a stronger commitment to family values and at the same time gave priority to work over family obligations. A comparative study of Japan and Germany found similar results, showing that men were more likely to support family values while giving priority to work over the family (Amano, 2001). Japanese men do not experience the links between family and work as contradictory because they have accepted the hegemonic values of the work-management system (Shibata, 2006). Their commitment to family values does not mean active participation in family life. Japanese women show lower support for family-oriented values compared to men, while giving higher support to active participation in the local community, suggesting that women play a key role in linking home and community.

Several of our value-items did not yield significant gender differences in either country: both American and Japanese women and men gave equal support to social mobility (v48), respect for elders (v56), social participation (v57), saving (v175), and protecting the environment (v235). This lack of difference should be understood in the context of the previous discussion of the relation between private and public spheres. In both countries, men and women show equal support for values stressing mobility and social participation. However, for Japanese women, mobility is actualized through men's careers. In both countries, there is an overlap in the general tendency for men to support more individualist and political views. The overall patterns in the United States and Japan do not differ greatly regarding the direction, if not the strength, of coefficients. The only value-item that actually showed a reversed relationship between Japan and the United States was the importance of having children. Japanese men's support of this statement was significantly higher than Japanese women's; in the United States, women's support was higher than men's.

### General Value Orientations (Scales) and Gender Difference

In order to provide a clearer and more manageable tool with which to analyze potential gender differences, we organized individual value-items into five scales. The selection and grouping of these values reflect previous research that linked these items to specific dimensions using factor analysis (see Silver, 2002). We decided to use these factors because they provide a clearer analysis of value orientations. Each scale is designed to capture an overall value orientation toward one domain (See Appendix A for a

**Table II.** Means of Value Orientations (Scales) for Women and Men in the United States and Japan

Value orientations:			
United States	U.S. women	U.S. men	Means difference <sup>a</sup>
Individual orientation	3.25	3.45	-0.20*
Familial orientation	3.39	3.23	0.16*
Cultural orientation	4.07	4.03	0.04
Traditional orientation	2.18	2.11	0.07
Political orientation	2.15	2.26	-0.11
Value orientations: Japan			
	Japanese women	Japanese men	Means difference <sup>a</sup>
Individual orientation	3.02	3.19	-0.17*
Familial orientation	3.86	3.97	-0.11*
Cultural orientation	4.08	4.12	-0.04
Traditional orientation	2.58	2.56	0.02
Political orientation	1.78	1.95	-0.17*

<sup>a</sup>Women/men.

\* $p < 0.05$ .

description of the scales)<sup>8</sup>:

1. *Individual orientation* refers to value-items that stress individualistic strivings.
2. *Familial orientation* refers to value-items related to family relations.
3. *Cultural orientation* refers to value-items that stress normative expectations regarding an individual's involvement with social groups and cultural institutions. It taps relational expectations between the individual and social groups.
4. *Traditional orientation* refers to value-items that stress social prudence and conformity to parental expectations.
5. *Political orientation* refers to items that stress the intergenerational nature of a commitment to ideologies about the country and the environment.

On the whole, the findings from the value scales reiterate the general ideas expressed in the previous analysis. The tendencies of U.S. men and women in the five value domains surveyed appear pretty similar. Three value orientations—cultural, traditional, and political—showed no significant gender differences (see Table II).

<sup>8</sup>We are confident in our ability to compare across cultures without adjusting means because neither country consistently scored higher (indicating higher agreement) on any of the individual items or value orientations.

The lack of gender differences in these specific value orientations is intriguing. We are not at the point of providing a full explanation, but we can suggest that these domains are less invested from the start with clear-cut, socially defined gender expectations. However, the table shows significant gender differences in individual and familial orientations. Men were more likely to support the individual orientation, while women were more likely to support the familial orientation. The division between the public world of men and the private world of women seemed maintained.

In Japan, there were no significant gender differences in cultural and traditional orientations (see Table II). As noted before, Japanese women were never dominant in any of the value scales, leading us to stress the stronger identification of women with a patriarchal normative social order. Japanese men were more likely than women to support individual, familial, and political orientations.

We found evidence in both countries to confirm the characterization of men as more individualistic. But we also found that women and men did not differ on values that are stereotypically associated with women. For instance, women do not show stronger support for the cultural orientation, which represents the values of interconnectedness, fairness, and social participation. Furthermore, while women in the United States were *more* oriented towards the family than U.S. men, Japanese women were *less* family-oriented than Japanese men. The family, while being a private institution, is tightly connected with the school, local communities, and the state in ways that bring about greater control over the private life and affects of individuals. In Japan, the family is defined as a microcosm of the state, embodying many of its principles and employed to enforce and control value orientations (Sugimoto, 1997). It is a place for nurturing and socializing children and for transmitting social, cultural, and nationalistic values, within a division of labor tied to men's role in the labor force. The emphasis on work over family obligations and total loyalty to the corporation legitimizes a traditional division of labor and a labor-management philosophy that removes the husband from actual contributions in the home. In the United States, the family is conceived as the ultimate sphere of privacy, separate from and often at odds with public institutions like the school and local government. Men's involvement in family life suggests greater participation, if not greater equality, in the division of labor. The privacy of the home and the sharper separation between private and public spheres assigns women a stronger familial orientation and men a stronger political orientation. We aim to clarify further this picture of gender differences by looking at the ways value orientations are affected by other demographic and human-capital variables.

## GENDER EFFECTS RELATIVE TO OTHER DEMOGRAPHIC AND HUMAN-CAPITAL VARIABLES

By comparing means and mean differences in Japan and the United States, we saw that Japan showed significant gender differences on more items, both among individual items and value scales. We turn now to an analysis of men's and women's locations in the socioeconomic structure, using multivariate analyses, and present a study of the effects of demographic and human-capital variables on value orientations in the two countries (see Appendix B for descriptive statistics of these variables).<sup>9</sup> At this point, we are addressing our second set of hypotheses and asking two questions. First, to what extent are gender effects still significant once we have controlled for additional demographic and human-capital variables? Second, how important is gender in predicting orientations compared to other characteristics? We first assessed the existence of significant gender differences in orientations using OLS regression models with controls for age, educational attainment, income, employment status, marriage, and children. We then compared the relative importance of our variables (using standardized coefficients) on value orientations.

### The Case of the United States

Recall that we found significant gender differences in individual and familial orientations in the United States. We were surprised to see gender differences on familial orientation disappear once we controlled for demographic and human-capital characteristics, specifically when variables for marriage and children were entered into the equation (see Table III). We cannot be sure of the direction of causality,<sup>10</sup> though we can say that a stronger association exists between having children and familial orientation than between gender and familial orientation. This could suggest that in the United States, marriage and the presence of children affect men and women in similar ways, an idea that we test later using an interaction term.

With controls for background characteristics, gender difference remains significant only for individual orientation, with men having higher coefficients than women ( $-0.213$ ). Research on socialization has shown that boys and girls are socialized differently and internalize different

<sup>9</sup>We did not look at race or ethnic differences in our comparative study of values. Respondents were not asked to give their ethnic and racial backgrounds.

<sup>10</sup>Responses to values are measured later in time than decisions to marry, have children, accumulate schooling, work, and earn money; however, values are deep-seated and can persist, therefore mutually influencing these decisions.



**Table III.** Regression of Value Orientations on Demographic and Human-Capital Characteristics (Unstandardized Coefficients, OLS Estimates)

	Individual orientation		Familial orientation		Cultural orientation		Traditional orientation		Political orientation	
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 1	Model 2	Model 1	Model 2	Model 1	Model 2	Model 1	Model 2
<b>United States</b>										
Constant		4.236*		3.510*		3.606*		1.782*		1.710*
Female <sup>a</sup>	-0.204*	-0.213*	0.162*	0.060	0.037	0.066	0.070	0.032	-0.109	-0.127
Age		-0.006*		-0.001		0.003*		0.009*		3.97E-05
Education <sup>b</sup>										
High school		-0.253*		-0.337*		0.069		-0.075		0.271*
Some college or more		-0.277*		-0.516*		0.260*		-0.194*		0.461*
Income in dollars		-0.053*		-0.042*		0.028*		-0.053*		0.032
Employment status <sup>c</sup>										
Part time		-0.058		0.107		0.101		0.208		-0.198
Not working		0.019		0.149*		0.018		0.113*		0.135
Married <sup>b</sup>		-0.103*		0.056		0.105*		0.288*		0.150
Children <sup>b</sup>		-0.085		0.295*		-0.013		0.081		0.026
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>		0.080		0.103		0.046		0.084		0.012
<b>Japan</b>										
Constant		3.660*		3.473*		3.265*		1.984*		0.251
Female <sup>a</sup>	0.167*	-0.181*	-0.115*	-0.081*	-0.039	-0.024	0.017	-0.034	-0.169*	-0.119
Age		-0.005*		0.007*		0.012*		0.014*		0.022*
Education <sup>b</sup>										
High school		-0.149*		-0.132*		0.015		0.034		0.457*
Some college or more		-0.158*		-0.132*		0.110*		-0.160*		0.654*
Income in dollars		-0.017		-0.001		0.041*		-0.013		0.095*
Employment status <sup>c</sup>										
Part time		0.020		-0.085		0.044		0.162*		0.033
Not working		0.138*		0.030		0.038		-0.005		0.076
Married <sup>b</sup>		-0.128		0.012		0.114*		-0.018		0.190
Children <sup>b</sup>		0.020		0.330*		0.000		-0.007		-0.347*
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>		0.018		0.086		0.107		0.067		0.049

<sup>a</sup>Reference category is male.  
<sup>b</sup>Reference category is less than high school.  
<sup>c</sup>Reference category is working full time.  
<sup>d</sup>Reference category is single, divorced, or widowed.  
<sup>e</sup>Reference category is no children.  
 \*p < 0.05.

social norms (Benjamin, 1988; Lueptow, 2001). For some social theorists, the “nurturing” and “protective” role of women/mothers in the family reflects the different identifications that develop for boys and girls (Chodorow, 1978). One key difference is based on the relative importance of cooperative versus competitive orientations, as Janet Lever has shown in her analysis of children’s games. Girls are more likely to develop greater sensitivity that affects their ability to relate (Lever, 1978). Our findings could be interpreted as supporting gender differences on that particular tendency, having controlled for everything else.

While gender remained significant for the individual orientation, age and education had stronger associations, showing higher standardized coefficients.<sup>11</sup> Income and marriage also had significant coefficients. Gender continues to predict significantly only individual orientation, while age and education are stronger and more consistent predictors of all the value orientations (Pascarella and Terenzini, 1991). The same is true, although to a lesser extent, for employment status, income, marriage, and children. There is a mutual influence between marriage and relatedness, as recent work using longitudinal data has shown (Liefbroer, 2002; Moors, 2002); however, our research does not allow us to infer causality.

### The Case of Japan

In Japan, once we controlled for additional variables, we found that gender difference disappeared for political orientation, and remained significant for individual orientation (-0.181) and familial orientation (-0.081), with women showing lower orientations on both (see Table III). These results support our previous findings and give further credence to the specificity of the Japanese familial/employment nexus based on expectations of strict division of labor and women’s limited participation in the economy. The centrality of the family in Japanese culture does not necessarily mean that women are family-oriented in the Western sense of the word. Men’s devotion to family values takes the form of working for a family wage (Kimoto, 2000). These findings support our previous interpretation, showing no contradiction for men between the priority given to work and strong family values, especially regarding the transmission of values to younger generations, where wives provide the key to children’s entry into the strict educational system and husbands’ success in the occupational world.

<sup>11</sup> Standardized coefficients not shown here.

In Japan as in the United States, gender continues to be an important predictor of individual orientation, which has the highest standardized coefficient among the various factors. While gender also remains significant for familial orientation, having children is by far the most important variable, followed by age and education. In Japan age is a major axis of social stratification and value orientations, affecting all domains of social organization (Ishida, 1993; Silver and Muller, 1997), which supports our previous findings.<sup>12</sup> Education plays less of a role than age in the way it affects value orientation. Children, and to a lesser extent marriage, are also associated with some of our value orientations.

### Nationality Versus Gender

We turn now to a comparison of the importance of gender and nation in the way they affect value orientations by examining their effect on the merged United States/Japan sample (Table IV).<sup>13</sup> We find that national culture rather than gender has a greater impact on value orientations.

On the merged sample, we find that gender is a significant predictor of only two of our value orientations: the individual and political orientations. On both, women score lower than men, meaning that they show less support for these orientations. In contrast, significant national differences exist on four of our five value orientations: American respondents score higher on individual and political orientations, and Japanese respondents score higher on familial and traditional orientations. Gender remains an important predictor of individual orientation, even more important than national culture. The picture is different for political orientation, for which nation is one of the most important predictors, and gender is one of the least important. Nation is also by far the strongest predictor of familial and traditional orientations. To summarize, nation is a more consistent and important predictor of values than is gender, although education and age are also important determinants of overall orientations. We now turn to an analysis of how gender interacts with demographic and human-capital variables in each country.

<sup>12</sup>We are not in a position to differentiate between age effects and cohort effects because our surveys are cross-sectional. Thus, the effect of the age variable could be partly due to cohort differences in value orientations.

<sup>13</sup>Because of the careful wording of questions and because neither country showed higher agreement with our value items, we simply merged the two datasets into one for an analysis of nation effects.

**Table IV.** Regression of Gender and Nation on Value Orientations (Unstandardized and Standardized Coefficients, OLS Estimates)

	Individual orientation		Familial orientation		Cultural orientation		Traditional orientation		Political orientation	
	Unstand.	Stand.	Unstand.	Stand.	Unstand.	Stand.	Unstand.	Stand.	Unstand.	Stand.
Constant	4.118*		3.359*		3.501*		1.827*		1.365*	
Female	-0.206*	-0.116	-0.044	-0.025	0.013	0.010	0.017	0.008	-0.135*	-0.043
Japan <sup>a</sup>	-0.192*	-0.107	0.526*	0.291	0.009	0.007	0.320*	0.157	-0.365*	-0.116
Age	-0.006*	-0.108	0.002*	0.044	0.007*	0.186	0.011*	0.175	0.010*	0.105
High school	-0.204*	-0.112	-0.250*	-0.136	-0.009	-0.007	-0.030	-0.014	0.291*	0.091
Some college	-0.228*	-0.124	-0.352*	-0.190	0.131*	0.100	-0.190*	-0.091	0.458*	0.143
or more										
Income	-0.035*	-0.056	-0.028*	-0.045	0.037*	0.083	-0.031*	-0.045	0.061*	0.056
Full-time <sup>b</sup>	-0.050	-0.116	-0.044	-0.023	-0.018	-0.013	-0.102*	-0.048	-0.056	-0.017
Married	-0.126*	-0.107	0.013	0.007	0.118*	0.086	0.174*	0.080	0.133	0.040
Children	-0.037	-0.108	0.334*	0.158	0.001	0.000	0.028	0.012	-0.105	-0.029
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.057		0.182		0.060		0.113		0.035	

<sup>a</sup>Reference category is the United States.

<sup>b</sup>Reference category is working part-time or not working.

\* $p < 0.05$ .

**Table V.** Significant Gender Interactions for Value-Orientation Regression: Standardized Coefficients, OLS Estimates,  $p < 0.05$ 

Interactions	United States	Japan	
Age			
Gender × Age	Political (-0.014)	None	
Education			
Gender × High school	None	Traditional (-0.248)	
Gender × Some college or more	None	None	
Income			
Gender × Income	None	None	
Employment status			
Gender × Full-time	Traditional (-0.232)	None	
Married			
Gender × Married	None	Familial (-0.225)	
Children			
Gender × Children	None	None	

### INTERACTION EFFECTS OF DEMOGRAPHIC AND HUMAN-CAPITAL VARIABLES ON MEN AND WOMEN'S VALUE ORIENTATIONS

We saw in the previous section that gender was overshadowed by age, education, and national culture, which were more important and consistent predictors of value orientations in both countries. We hypothesized earlier that men and women might be affected differently by these demographic and human-capital characteristics. Specifically, we hypothesized that marriage, children, and employment status would affect women's values more than men's, particularly on cultural and familial orientations. In order to test these ideas, we introduced interaction terms between gender and our five value orientations one at a time.<sup>14</sup>

#### The Case of the United States

We begin by reporting instances in the United States of no interaction between gender and our control variables. We did not find statistically significant interaction terms between gender and education, income, marriage, and children (Table V). This disproves our hypothesis that marriage and

<sup>14</sup>In order not to dilute the effect of each interaction term, we ran separate regressions for each set of interactions. In the event of a significant gender interaction, we ran regressions on men and women separately. We do not present the separate regressions here because they are too numerous. Rather, we present a summary table of the significant interaction effects in the United States and Japan. Please contact Tania Levey at tlevey@york.cuny.edu if you would like to obtain a set of these regression tables.

children would affect women's values differently. How can we make sense of this surprising finding? Could the lack of interaction effects be a reflection of shared idealized values about marriage and parenthood? This interpretation is supported by the work of Williams and Best, who have shown a discrepancy between "actual" versus "ideal" perceptions of the self. In their comparative studies of 14 countries, American men and women had different scores regarding perceptions of their "actual self," but the differences disappeared when describing their "ideal self" (1990:103). In other words, the idealized and fantasized representations of self-attributes were similar across gender despite men's and women's perceived actual differences. Compared to the above analyses of no interaction, age affects men and women in similar ways except for political orientation. A significant negative coefficient for the interaction term ( $-0.014$ ) suggests that age has less of an effect on women's political orientation.

Partially confirming our hypothesis, employment status has a greater effect on women's traditional orientation compared to that for men. Separate regressions show that women who work full-time are much less traditional than similar women who do not work full-time ( $-0.337$ ), but men who work full-time are slightly more traditional than men who do not work full-time ( $0.040$ ). Traditional orientation represents, among other things, values surrounding a traditional division of labor in the home; therefore, it is understandable that employment status could affect women and men differently on this orientation. Research has suggested that work grounds men in a network of social obligations, while the lack of work outside the home makes women more traditional (Hochschild, 2003; Gerson, 1993). We suggest that working full-time for men makes them slightly more traditional, that is, more committed to familial responsibilities, but that employment status has more of an effect on women: not working makes them more willing to accept their place in the family, while working full-time makes them less willing to do so. Women who do not work outside the home are more likely to invest their lives in the family.

Surprisingly, we did not find a gender interaction with employment status for the family orientation, the only other orientation for which employment status had a significant association. The lack of interaction means that staying at home or working full-time does not influence men and women differently in orientation to the family. It is more the experience of one's location in the labor force, rather than the experience of being male or female, that orients one to the family. The same is true for educational attainment and income. While they have more frequent and important associations with our five value orientations, they do not exert gendered effects. We suggest that these institutions or social positions are less invested in

promoting gender differences. These results show that in the United States, men and women are generally affected in similar ways by our demographic and human-capital variables, with a few exceptions: age affects political orientation more for men, and employment status affects the level of traditional orientation more for women.

### The Case of Japan

In Japan, we found no interactions between gender and age, income, full-time work, or children (see Table V). As we saw before, age is one of the strongest and most pervasive dimensions of social organization among the Japanese, affecting men's and women's value orientations similarly. As in the United States, there were no interaction effects between gender and income. In contrast to our findings for the United States, we did not find an interaction between gender and full-time employment. Although we cannot be sure of the casual direction, this could reflect the different job opportunities and cultural constraints on the kinds of jobs held by Japanese women.

We found instances of interaction effects between gender and education and marriage. Having a high school diploma, relative to having less than a high school diploma, interacts with gender on the traditional orientation ( $-0.248$ ). Greater levels of education were associated with higher scores on traditional orientation, although this was less true for women than men. In fact, separate regressions showed higher-educated men to be *more* traditional ( $0.170$ ), and higher-educated women to be *less* traditional ( $-0.275$ ). In Japan, the average level of education is high, and educational credentials are important for occupational careers. However, education plays very different roles for men and women. Regardless of education, men in Japan expect to have similar relationships to the household, their spouses, and their parents, while for women, high school apparently opens up a new orientation to their role in the family. Japanese women's seemingly traditional roles in the home are primarily geared toward the educational future of the children and men's occupational success in a rapidly modernizing nation. A focus on family life is geared toward achieving middle-class status through household consumption and men's career advancement. For them the meaning of education is clearly different.

Because Japanese society is more rooted in tradition than U.S. society, we expected being married and having children to have a differential impact on the value orientations of men and women. This was not true for having children, although we did find an interaction with marital status for

familial orientation. Married respondents scored higher on familial orientation ( $0.012$ ) than those who were single. A statistically significant interaction term ( $-0.225$ ) suggests gender differences in the effects of marriage on familial orientation. Separate regressions show that married men score higher on familial orientation than unmarried men ( $0.114$ ), whereas married women score lower than unmarried women ( $-0.047$ ). While enduring values can also influence decisions to marry, these findings support those of panel studies that have shown men to be more in favor of their wives taking on the role of housewife than the women themselves were (Liebroer, 2002; Berrington, 2002).

Gender interaction terms did not add much to our understanding of gender differences in value orientations. Although our control variables had important direct effects on value orientations, we found few differences in the way age, education, income, employment, and marriage interacted with gender. On the whole, these results provide weak support for our interaction hypotheses, particularly the expectation that marriage and children would affect men and women differently. Employment status shows small variations, suggesting that while the work context differs for men and women, it reinforces previously internalized values rather than challenging them, particularly in Japan. The negative interaction of gender with marriage shows that marriage is associated with greater familial orientation among Japanese men.

### CONCLUSION: GENDER AND VALUE ORIENTATIONS—WHAT'S THE DIFFERENCE!?

Our analysis of the *Generations Survey* data demonstrated that gender differences in values and value orientations in Japan and the United States were neither systematic nor consistent. Going back to our hypotheses, we did not find as many gender differences as we expected. Our expectation that gender differences would disappear after controlling for demographic and human-capital variables was confirmed, except that men still scored higher than women on the individual orientation in both countries. This finding supports previous research (Marini, 1990; Beutel and Marini, 1995). However, gender differences in other value orientations were not strong and often disappeared with the introduction of controls. Gender differences were stronger in Japan, where men and women continued to differ on familial orientation as well. When differences appeared, they both supported and challenged existing stereotypes regarding gender differences. For example, both countries showed gender differences regarding individual

orientation, supporting the idea that women are less individualistic than men; Japanese men scored higher on familial orientation than Japanese women, challenging stereotypes and pointing to a different meaning given to the relationship between family and work. The finding underscores the normative expectations and cultural meaning of men's work in relationship to family obligations in Japan. Neither country showed gender differences on cultural orientation. Cultural expressions in both countries affect men and women equally. This finding supports the homogenizing effect of mass culture in postindustrial societies.

Our hypotheses regarding the idea that value differences would reflect the power differential of men and women in the social structure were not fully actualized. We did not find strong and consistent gender differences in value orientations in specific social domains, raising the theoretical issue of the relationship between structures and values. These findings are supported by models that point to a pattern of disjunction between values and behavior, theorizing values as belonging to separate social and emotional systems that can nevertheless intersect from time to time over the life course (Kimoto, 1995). This lack of "fit" between structural positioning and value orientations could also reflect the fact that value systems change more slowly than structures of inequalities, as Chafe has suggested (1991). However, the limitations of our cross-sectional data prevent us from providing clarification for many of these ideas.

Our hypotheses regarding the interaction effects between gender and demographic and human-capital variables were only partly supported, challenging existing stereotypes. We expected to find interactions of gender with marriage and children in both countries. However, men's and women's value orientations were, on the whole, similarly affected by marriage and the presence of children, with the exception of familial orientation in Japan, where Japanese men were *more* affected by marriage because of the stronger link in Japan between family status and employment. Employment status was the only variable to show several interactions with gender, although it did so in different ways across countries. "Not working" was associated with a greater increase in traditional orientation among women in the United States. This finding supports previous research showing that nonworking women have more traditional values and attitudes. In Japan, however, "not working" was associated among women with a greater increase in individual and cultural orientations. While surprising at first, this finding supports research in Japan (Bumiller, 1995) that describes women's lack of involvement in the world of work as a reprieve from conformity and pressures coming from the workplace. Family life is viewed as a source of individual manifestations of and access to cultural expressions.

Conversely, working full-time was associated with less traditionalism among women in the United States. Education showed only one interaction effect with gender in Japan on traditional orientation, and age only showed one interaction with gender in the United States on political orientation, both affecting men and women in different ways. In other words, men in the United States became more politically conservative than women with age. In Japan, education brought about a more traditional orientation for men than for women, and a less traditional orientation for women, to an even greater extent. Income had no interaction effects with gender in either country. Our findings regarding the limited scope of gender differences suggest that the concept of gender should not be privileged in an analysis of values. Gender as a category cannot be isolated from other features of the individual. Looking at gender differences without controlling for other variables or without looking at interaction terms has led to erroneous assertions of gender differences.

These results and their interpretations show the importance of comparative research in clarifying some puzzling results by focusing on the processes of gendering within cultural parameters. We conclude by raising some theoretical issues regarding the possible meaning of gender differences.

1. The lack of systematic gender differences in value orientations may suggest that men and women have internalized similar normative conceptions of their societies' expectations. In the United States, men and women both internalize the belief in the "American dream"; in Japan, men and women both identify with the idea of "Nihonjinron" that describes the specialness of Japanese culture and character. Thus, the values of men and women in each country may reflect a shared vision of society, however idealized, that does not seem to correspond with their differing socioeconomic positions in society.
2. The lack of consistent gender differences in value orientations despite existing socioeconomic inequalities suggests processes of idealization that hide the existing power relations between men and women, especially in Japan. Women try to rationalize their positions through an acceptance of mainstream patriarchal ideas in order to fit into a system that has little room for their distinctive socioeconomic needs. Our comparative findings lead us to suggest that the stronger the strength the normative order on gender differences, the greater the need for women to conform.
3. The lack of gender variations in value orientations may suggest the limited usefulness of gender as a binary construct in the analysis of social identity. Gender differences in values must be understood as part of a

larger social matrix. According to Sedgwick's formulation, "The biological, psychological and cognitive attributes of men overlap with those of women by vastly more than they differ: Why pay so much attention to gender? Why the focus on gender differences as a privileged locale for analysis?" (1993:5).

By giving gender a special status in social research, investigators often create a simplified, if not distorted, view of gender differences based primarily on socioeconomic inequalities and/or views of male domination. Gender differences are shaped by many intervening social factors that this research could not fully identify. However, our comparative approach showed gender to be less significant in accounting for value orientations than other factors such as nationality.

We conclude by stating that while there are some gender differences in values, gender cannot be isolated from other features of the individual and must be sensitive to cultural variations. We suggest that while there are a few clear gender differences, the similarities between genders are striking, challenging some deeply held views. After so much emphasis on gender in social research, it may be useful to engage in a "degendering" process to bring to light the complexities of the gendering process (Lorber, 2005b). A history of the concept of "gender" as it has been used in social research over the past several decades, by non-feminists and feminists alike, is needed to disclose the hidden links between research, ideology, and identity politics.

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### APPENDIX A: VALUE-ORIENTATION SCALES

#### Individual Orientation

One can succeed by trying very hard and having a little bit of luck. (v48)

If you have money, almost everything will go your way. (v49)

You should honestly say what you think, even if it means hurting another person. (v50)

#### Familial Orientation

Life without children is empty. (v55)

Older people should be respected primarily because of their age. (v56)

Breaking a promise to family member is acceptable when your job requires it. (v58)

#### Cultural Orientation

One must never forget the kindness received from others. (v51)

A person should not resort to a means he or she knows is wrong, even though it will lead to success. (v52)

One should actively participate in local activities and functions. (v57)

One should actively sacrifice some of his or her lifestyle for the sake of society. (v60)

#### Traditional Orientation

One shouldn't behave in a way that goes against his/her parents' expectations. (v159)

A desirable household is one in which the man works and the woman takes care of the home. (v167)

It is best to save as much money as possible for the future. (v175)

A person should take good care of and continue to use his or her possessions even when they are rather old. (v183a)

#### Political Orientation

It is important to pass on local culture and traditions to the next generation. (v232)

It is important to pass on the value of defending one's country to the next generation. (v233)



It is important to pass on the value of democracy to the next generation. (v234)

It is important to pass the value of protecting the environment to the next generation. (v235)

Note: Our individual, family, and cultural scales were constructed by taking the mean of items that were measured on a five-point scale, from "strongly agree" to "strongly disagree." Our political and traditional scales were constructed by summing dichotomous items ("agree" or "disagree").

### APPENDIX B: DEMOGRAPHIC AND HUMAN-CAPITAL CHARACTERISTICS

	U.S. women	U.S. men	Japanese women	Japanese men	All
Mean age (standard deviation)	44.3 (17.6355)	42.3 (17.3401)	46.8 (15.7582)	48.0 (15.8834)	45.5 (16.7352)
Education (%)					
Less than high school	20.8	15.9	24.6	25.7	22.0
High school graduate	32.1	31.7	49.0	42.0	39.4
Some college or more	47.1	52.4	26.4	32.4	38.6
Income in categories (%)					
Less than \$7,500	13.2	6.2	8.9	5.2	8.4
\$7,500–24,999	33.0	29.7	17.7	19.0	24.7
\$25,000–34,999	16.5	15.2	19.3	22.9	18.5
\$35,000–49,999	16.5	20.8	34.6	31.7	26.1
\$50,000–74,000	14.0	16.5	11.8	13.5	13.9
\$75,000–\$99,999	3.9	6.5	4.3	4.0	4.6
\$100,000 or over	2.8	5.0	3.4	3.7	3.7
Employment status (%)					
Working full time	54.8	68.6	52.0	82.7	64.0
Working part time	4.6	2.7	34.8	—	12.1
Not working	40.5	28.7	13.3	17.3	23.9
Married	53.4	57.8	76.2	80.4	67.7
Have children	79.3	62.2	81.2	79.0	75.9

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